Nadeem Ul Haque, Vice-Chancellor, PIDE and Raja Rafi Ullah, Research Fellow, PIDE
Pakistan throughout its history has seen regime changes from more democratic to more authoritarian and vice versa. This has meant that the country’s political and social landscapes have remained volatile and unstable. Many economists argue that this instability has partly contributed to the stifled and irregular growth patterns in the country. The average GDP growth rate has been irregular from decade to decade, with an overall long-run downward trend (See Figure 1).If political stability is a prerequisite to sustained rapid economic growth, have then stable non-democratic regimes been more successful in Pakistan at spurring high growth and leading to higher standards of living? Surely, such simplistic viewpoints are mere rhetoric. A study published in The Pakistan Development Review in 2016 that used data from 1960-2013 for 92 countries including Pakistan found a negative relationship between Human Development Index (HDI) and prevalence of authoritarian institutions.[3] Furthermore, experts argue that for democratic regimes to lead to sustained rapid economic growth, the democratic institutions must be allowed to mature over time through successful democratic transfers of power.______________________________[1] This Knowledge Brief is a follow-up to a webinar organised by PIDE titled, “Towards a Stable Economy and Politics” on May 9, 2020. Moderated by the VC, PIDE, Dr. Nadeem Ul Haque, the speakers included Wasim Sajjad (lawyer, Politician and Former Senate Chairman), Irfan Qadir (Former Attorney General of Pakistan), and Hasan Askari Rizvi (Pakistani Political Scientist and Military Analyst).[2] Data Source: Pakistan, World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2020[3] Khan, Batool, and Shah (2016), The Pakistan Development Review, 55(4).
Mature representative institutions are a key ingredient to sustained economic growth[4]and same is true for state institutions such as the executive, parliament, bureaucracy and the judiciary. Unfortunately, Pakistan throughout its history has maintained non-representative state institutions that serve to maintain the status quo. This in part is due to the colonial[5] setup of the state machinery that Pakistan inherited upon independence. Having said that, all cannot be attributed to historical contingency; there are systematic issues that if addressed can help bring about stable and representative institutions that drive sustained rapid economic growth.
Governance issues have typically impeded economic growth and investment in the country. Pakistan has too many layers of government that many times have hampered the growth of private enterprise in the country. This view is echoed in Pakistan’s ranking on World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs). Pakistan has the lowest percentile rank among its peer countries[6] on 3 out of 6 WGI indicators: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Rule of Law. Of the three remaining indicators on Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption only Bangladesh is ranked lower. [7] (See Figure 2)Given the scenario described above, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) brought together experts[9] for a webinar to discuss the issues. A summary of the questions addressed in the webinar is presented below:____________________________[4] Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), Chapter 5, Why Nations Fail.[5] Haque, Nadeem Ul. (2017), Looking Back: How Pakistan Became an Asian Tiger by 2050.[6] WGI Indicators (2018) comparison of 4 South Asian Countries: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan & Sri Lanka.[7] Worldwide Governance Indicators (2018), World Bank, info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi[8] Worldwide Governance Indicators (2018), World Bank.
The politics in Pakistan is characterised by a dilemma where despite there being hotly contested elections the political landscape is still dominated by families and dynasties. Those who are not part of existing powerful political families/dynasties have low chances of both entering politics and being successful in elections. Cheema et al. (2013) investigated this question of dynastic politics using data from Punjab and found that from 1985-2008 on average two-thirds of elected national-level legislators (MNAs) and about half of all MNA candidates from MNA constituencies in Punjab were dynastic. [10] (See Figure 3) The data points towards the fact that there is a high incidence of dynastic politicians (also known as electables) who have permeated the system down the level of individual constituencies. Although Cheema et al. (2013) have used data from Punjab only, the situation in other provinces in Pakistan can be assumed to follow similar patterns. Comparatively speaking on a regional level, the percentage of dynastic legislators in the national assembly observed by Cheema et al. (2013) is almost twice the percentage of such legislators in the Indian National Assembly/Lok Sabha. [12]Despite there still being a high incidence of dynastic politics in Pakistan, the numbers have declined slightly in urban areas over the past few decades. Whereas in non-urban areas the problem still remains pronounced. And we should remember that the distribution of constituencies has not been aligned with the new census._________________________[9] See back-end of the document for list of webinar panelists.[10] Cheema, Ali., Javaid, Hassan., and Naseer, Farooq (2013), Dynastic Politics in Punjab: Facts, Myths and their Implications, IDEAS, Pg. 1[11] Cheema, Ali., Javaid, Hassan., and Naseer, Farooq (2013), Dynastic Politics in Punjab: Facts, Myths and their Implications, IDEAS, Pg. 2[12] French, Patrick. (2011). Quoted in Cheema, Ali., Javaid, Hassan., and Naseer, Farooq (2013), Dynastic Politics in Punjab: Facts, Myths and their Implications, IDEAS, Pg. 2
In comparison to urban politicians, dynastic politicians in cities are 40 percent points less likely to win their constituencies. (See Figure 4) Furthermore, the number of elections that don’t have any dynastic politician running for office is 10 percent points higher in urban areas as compared to rural areas. (See Figure 4)Despite the observed decline in urban areas, familial political dynasties still wield significant power in Pakistan and continue to maintain the status quo. Having said that, certain policies if implemented correctly can trigger transformation and make entry of more non-dynastic politicians into the system possible. Adjusting constituencies in line with the censuses will allow increasing urbanisation to open out the political landscape. The hold of dynasties will weaken.Strengthening and facilitating the local government system by holding periodic elections. Barriers to entry in local elections for non-dynastic politicians are less than in elections at higher levels i.e. provincial and national.Furthermore, many countries in the world have term limits on “one or more executive and elected positions. Pakistan no longer has any term limits on any directly elected position. We only have term limit for the post of the President which at best can be described as only a ceremonial position under the current constitution arrangement. Introducing term limits for positions such as the “Prime Minister, Minister or even membership of parliament” will allow for new people to come into the system.[14]
Free and fair elections on periodic basis are one of the most effective ways through which a country’s institutions mature over time. Pakistan for the first time in its history has had two parliaments complete the constitutional 5 years without a mid-year election (2008-2013 and 2013-2018). This is a welcome sign, but the electoral system in Pakistan needs to be reformed to accelerate the process of building strong democratic systems in the country.
_______________________[13] Cheema, Ali., Javaid, Hassan., and Naseer, Farooq (2013), Dynastic Politics in Punjab: Facts, Myths and their Implications, IDEAS, Pg. 5.[14] Haque, Nadeem Ul. (2017), Designing Democracy and What is the PM Term?, Development 2.0__________________________[15] Electoral Systems Around The World, FairVote.org
__________________________[16] Article 52 of Constitution, Pakistanconstitutionlaw.com[17] Article 106 of Constitution, Pakistanconstitutionlaw.com[18] Shah, Waseem. (2018), Mechanisms for filling reserved seats seen as flawed, DAWN Newspaper[19] General Elections 2018, Election Commission of Pakistan.[20] General Elections 2013 Report, Election Commission of Pakistan.[21] Figures include proportionally allocated reserved seats for women and minorities.[22] Elections Act 2017.[23] Elections Act 2017.[24] 14th Amendment, Pakistanconstitutionlaw.com
An empowered strong legislature including the parliament needs to complement the executive branch in policy making. Currently, the parliament as a body is not strong and doesn’t guide bulk of the policy making.
Technical processes such as management of public health, managing the energy sector and formulating an effective Public Sector Development Program (PSDP) are tasks that require level of expertise that go beyond political dictation. In Pakistan elected politicians, particularly those who are vested with some sort of executive power often interfere in ways that impede evidence-based policy formulation and implementation of technical processes. Furthermore, there is a common perception among politicians and public at-large that ‘technocrats’ have harmed the democratic system since most dictators brought an entourage of technocrats into government. However, this rhetoric and complementary aversion of politicians to technocrats is misleading, because in principle Pakistan has never had technocrats brought into policy making through a rigorous selection process. Those technocrats who have ended up in positions of authority under dictators have often come about because of cronyism rather than as a result of selecting the best suited persons for the jobs. [32]Our panelists agreed that in most mature democracies it is not the ministers and ones with executive power that dictate specifics of policy formulation which requires a level of expertise. If one was to draw parallels to how a corporation is run; the ministers in mature setups act as board members who give policy direction but are not involved in either day-to-day operations or formulation of policies that require specialised skills and qualifications. A good place to start in Pakistan could be to stop promoting rhetoric that “lumps all manner of skilled professionals into one vague category” i.e. ‘technocrats’.[33] Skilled professionals are part of almost all mature democratic systems and play a pivotal role in efficient service delivery and don’t act as an automatic antithesis to democratic elected politicians._______________________[31] Haque Nadeem Ul. (2018) , Imperial Democracy, Development 2.0.[32] Haque, Nadeem Ul. (2017), Why Do Politicians Hate Technocrats?, Development 2.0.[33] Haque, Nadeem Ul. (2017), Why Do Politicians Hate Technocrats?, Development 2.0.
Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J. A. (2013). Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty. Crown Publishing Group.Ahmed, M. (2018 Oct. 12). How big should the cabinet be?, DAWN, Column.Cabinet Division (2020). Available at: <cabinet.gov.pk>Cheema, A., Javaid, H. and Naseer, F. (2013). Dynastic politics in Punjab: Facts, myths and their implications. IDEAS.Databank.worldbank.org. (2020). World development indicators | Databank.Election Act and Election Rules, Election Commission of Pakistan. Available at: <https://www.ecp.gov.pk/frmGenericPage.aspx?PageID=3111>Election Report (2013). Election Commission of Pakistan. Available at: <https://www.ecp.gov.pk/ frmGenericPage.aspx?PageID=3050>Electoral Systems Around The World, Fairvote (2020). Fairvote.French, P. (2012). India: A portrait. (Vintage Departures).General Elections (2018). Election Commission of Pakistan. Available at: <https://www.ecp.gov.pk/ frmdynamicnotifications.aspx?id=17>Haque, N. (2007). Why civil service reforms do not work. SSRN Electronic Journal.Haque, N. (2017). Looking Back: How Pakistan became an Asian tiger by 2050 (1st ed.). Karachi: Kitab (Pvt.) Limited.Haque, N. (2020). Blog. Development 2.0. Available at: <http://development20.blogspot.com/>Haque, N., Din, M., Khawaja, M., Malik, W., Khan, F., Bashir, S. and Waqar, S. (2006). Perception survey of civil servants: A preliminary report. The Pakistan Development Review, 45(4II), pp. 1199–1226.Khan, K., Batool, S., & Shah, A. (2016). Authoritarian regimes and economic development: An empirical reflection. The Pakistan Development Review, 55(4I-II), pp. 657–673.Shah, W. (2018). Mechanism for filling reserved seats seen as flawed. Dawn Newspaper. https://www.dawn.com/news/1417406.Worldwide Governance Indicators (2018). Available at: <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>
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